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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution requires that an "actual Enumeration" of the popu-
lation of the United States be conducted every ten years.' The impor-
tance of this count should not be overlooked as statute dictates that the
census numbers be used, among other things, to determine the apportion-
ment of Congress. 2 Indeed, the census is viewed as "apportioning power
in American democracy." '3 Unfortunately, failure to count some portion
of the population has plagued every census count.4 This undercount cre-
ates the risk that congressional seats may be malapportioned.5 As a re-
sult, the Department of Commerce's Census Bureau has undertaken to
improve census-taking methods in order to correct the perennial un-
dercount problems caused by the traditional procedures. 6
This note will analyze the differences between the measures that the
Census Bureau has attempted to use (which have been ruled illegal by
courts) and those that have withstood judicial scrutiny in the Bureau's
attempt to improve the apportionment count. Section I provides a brief
summary of the undercount. Section II will provide a short history of the
statutory basis of the Census, so as to better understand the foundation of
the Supreme Court's decisions. Section III will begin with an analysis of
one system that the Census Bureau recently used in an attempt to allevi-
ate the undercount-statistical sampling. After briefly describing the
history and methods of statistical sampling, it will discuss why the Su-
preme Court ruled statistical sampling unconstitutional for the purposes
of the apportionment count in Department of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives.7 Section IV will analyze "hot-deck imputa-
tion," which is a new estimation system the Census Bureau has devised
to supplant sampling. This section will explore why the Supreme Court
ruled in Utah v. Evans8 that such a methodology passes both statutory
and constitutional muster. Section V will then examine the apparent in-
consistency of these two rulings, breaking down each decision according
1 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
2 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2000); see also Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Rep-
resentatives, 525 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1999).
3 Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85
MINN. L. REV. 899, 903 (2001).
4 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 322. See generally Daniel Garth Hazard, Note,
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives-Constitutional Text: Out
of Sight, Out of Mind, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 89 (2000); Persily, supra note 3, at 902-19 ("Statis-
tical Adjustment to Correct the Undercount").
5 Persily, supra note 3, at 903.
6 See id. at 904. Under the traditional method, the Census Bureau mailed census forms
to individuals and sent enumerators to conduct follow-up interviews with those who did not
return their forms.
7 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
8 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
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to rationale and the opinions of certain justices in an attempt to rational-
ize the results. Finally, Section VI will analyze the quagmire created by
the Supreme Court's two forays into interpretation of the Census Clause.
First, it will consider the inconsistency of the Evans decision vis-A-vis
the history of the Actual Enumeration Clause and try to provide insight
into what the Framers intended the census to be and how they intended it
to be conducted. Then it critiques the opposite view, championed by a
plurality in House of Representatives and the State of Utah in Evans.
Finally, this note will discuss how this solution is unworkable and prob-
lematic, not to mention unconstitutional.
The problems discussed in this paper are very real because each
time the census is conducted, a significant portion of the population is
not counted. Furthermore, minorities and urban residents are un-
dercounted at a significantly higher rate than majority and suburban re-
sidents. 9 The undercount from the last six censuses can be summarized
as follows:
ESTIMATED NET CENSUS UNDERCOUNT FROM 1940 TO 1990 AS
MEASURED BY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS (REVISED 1990 ESTIMATES) 10
NON- OVERALL NET
YEAR BLACK BLACK DIFFERENCE UNDERCOUNT
1940 8.4% 5.0% 3.4% 5.4%
1950 7.5% 3.8% 3.8% 4.1%
1960 6.6% 2.7% 3.9% 3.1%
1970 6.5% 2.2% 4.3% 2.7%
1980 4.5% 0.8% 3.7% 1.2%
1990 5.7% 1.3% 4.4% 1.8%
The results of each census determine the size of a state's delegation
in the House of Representatives and the Electoral College and are also
used to allocate revenue to state and local governments for social and
educational programs. I " Thus, an inaccurate count can have far-reaching
constitutional and social effects.' 2 An inaccurate census contributes to
social problems, unconstitutional malapportionment and seemingly end-
less litigation. Therefore, it is necessary to find a solution that remedies
9 Margo Anderson & Stephen E. Fienberg, The 2000 Census: Litigation, Results, and
Implications, 77 N.D. L. REV. 665, 669 (2001).
10 Id. at 669 (revised 1990 estimates).
I I Id. at 666-67.
12 Id. at 667, 669. The effects of revenue allocation can become very significant. For
example, in 1960, federal aid comprised 15% of all state and local spending. Id. at 669. These
effects will be discussed in more detail below.
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these problems while also passing constitutional muster. Unfortunately,
as this paper will show, such a solution remains far outside our grasp.
I. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE CENSUS
The first census was conducted in 1790.13 During this census, Con-
gress required the enumerators to "swear an oath to make 'a just and
perfect' enumeration of every person." 14 Congress clarified this direc-
tion in 1810 by directing that the "enumeration shall be made by an ac-
tual inquiry at every dwelling-house ... and not otherwise."' 15 Statutes
governing the next fourteen censuses maintained this requirement. 16
The 1954 Census Act, which governs modern censuses, initially
contained language requiring enumerators to personally visit each
"dwelling-house" within their area of responsibility. 17 In 1957, however,
the Secretary of Commerce asked Congress to allow departure from this
requirement and approve the use of statistical sampling in gathering cen-
sus information. 18 In response to this request, Congress added § 19519 to
the 1954 Census Act, which allowed the use of "the statistical method
known as 'sampling"' in carrying out the census, except with regard to
the "determination of population for apportionment purposes. '20 In
1964, Congress repealed the requirement of a personal visit to each
dwelling and permitted the Census Bureau to replace the personal visit
with the postal delivery and return of a form. 21 When this "mailout-
mailback" system fails to result in a returned form, Census Bureau enu-
merators conduct personal visits to the dwelling to gather the necessary
information. 22
The provisions of the 1954 Census Act took their present form in
1976, when Congress revised § 141, specifically allowing the use of
sampling procedures for the census of "population, housing, and matters
relating to population and housing. '23 However, this broad grant of au-
thority to use statistical sampling in the census remains restricted by
13 Thomas R. Lee, The Original Understanding of the Census Clause: Statistical Esti-
mates and the Constitutional Requirement of an "Actual Enumeration", 77 WASH. L. REV. 1,
6 (2002).
14 Id. (quoting House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 335 (quoting Act of Mar. 1, 1790,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 101)).
15 Id. (quoting House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 335 (quoting Act of Mar. 26, 1810,
§ 1, 2 Stat. 565-66)).
16 Id.
17 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 336 (citing Act of Aug. 31, 1954, §25(c), 68
Stat. 1012, 1015).
18 Id.
19 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1970).
20 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 336. (citing 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1970)).
21 Id. at 337.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 337-38 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 141(g)).
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§ 195, which "directly prohibits" the use of sampling in the decennial
census to determine population for the apportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives in Congress.
24
II. ATTACK ON THE EASTERN FRONT:
THE SAMPLING DISPUTE
The Constitution's Actual Enumeration Clause generally provokes a
wealth of litigation as each decennial census is planned and conducted.
For a time, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, much of the litigation
concerned the perpetual undercount and sought to force the Census Bu-
reau to acknowledge and remedy the problem.2 5 When the Bureau fi-
nally implemented new methods to correct the undercount, the litigation
did not abate but rather shifted to whether these methods were prohibited
by statute or the Constitution.2 6 For example, after the 1990 census more
than 170 different actions challenging the results were filed.27 One such
case, Wisconsin v. City of New York,2 8 was brought by an amalgamation
of states, cities, and citizens to challenge the Secretary of Commerce's
decision not to statistically adjust the 1990 census to make up for the
differential undercount.2 9 This challenge, though victorious before the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, was overruled by the Supreme Court.
30
In fact, no state or other group has ever prevailed in an action to win a
Congressional seat that was apportioned to another state, 31 notwithstand-
ing the wealth of litigation that has been fueled by over twenty censuses.
However, this fact has not quelled recent litigious efforts by those who
fear their state will lose Congressional seats as a result of inaccurate cen-
24 Id. at 338; see also id. at 339 n.6.
25 Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 9, at 672. The Department of Commerce and the
Census Bureau were able to prevail in these actions because they were able to demonstrate that
there was no known method available to correct the undercount. Id. However, some decisions
implied that the Bureau might be liable for discrimination under the Administrative Procedures
Act if serious research into the problem was not conducted. Id. (referring specifically to
Cuomo v. Baldridge, 674 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
26 Id. at 673.
27 Michael Janofsky, Utah, in Census War, Fights North Carolina for House Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A 18.
28 517 U.S. 1 (1996).
29 Id. at 10. The Secretary decided not to adjust the Census based on statistics because
that would "abandon a two hundred year tradition of how we actually count people" and he
wanted to be sure that such a method would "make the census better ... and more accurate."
Id. at 11. He was concerned that although numerical accuracy at the national level might be
improved, it could not be assured that distributive accuracy at the state and local levels would
be augmented. Id. This decision was challenged as unconstitutional and contrary to federal
law. Id. at 10-11.
30 Id. at 24.
31 See Janofsky, supra note 27, at AI8.
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sus data. The Census Bureau was well aware of this litigiousness as it
prepared for and conducted the 2000 census. 32
The cause of some of the more recent litigation began in 1997,
when the Census Bureau released a report to Congress describing how it
proposed to conduct the then-forthcoming 2000 census. 33 In this report,
the Bureau proposed the use of statistical sampling to supplement the
apportionment count. 34 Statistical sampling uses a randomly selected
sample of households that do not respond to the traditional census in-
quiry as "statistically representative" of the entire non-responding
group.35 The Bureau recommended this method in response to a con-
gressional mandate 36 directing the Secretary of Commerce to study new
"means by which the Government could achieve the most accurate popu-
lation count possible. '37 It was intended to alleviate the "chronic and
apparently growing problem" of the census undercounting certain groups
of individuals. 38 In addition to increasing accuracy, the new method was
aimed at reducing the cost of conducting the census. 39 Unfortunately,
statistical sampling has "become the chief controversy surrounding the
2000 census." 40
32 See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 473-74 (2002); see also Dep't of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999); United States House of Repre-
sentatives v. Dep't of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998); Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Va. 1998).
33 Lee, supra note 13, at 1.
34 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 320. It is interesting to note that this is not the
first time that the Census Bureau has sought to use sampling to supplement the census. Before
the 1990 Census, the Bureau tried to use statistical sampling, but they were blocked by then
Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher. Steven A. Holmes, Census Plan for 2000 Is Chal-
lenged on 2 Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1996 at A21.
35 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 324. The Census Bureau has long used sam-
pling as a method for determining national statistics such as poverty and unemployment rates,
but it had never been used for purposes of apportionment. Steven A. Holmes, In a First, 2000
Census Is to Use Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996 at A16. Even with sampling added, the
Bureau proposed to use either mail-in forms or enumerators until 90% of all households had
been counted. Id. Thereafter, they proposed to take a statistical sample of the remaining 10%,
dispatch enumerators to count them (repeatedly if necessary), and use those results to estimate
the total number that were originally missed. Id.
36 Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991 §2(a)(l). Under the statute, the Secretary
was to contract with the National Academy of Sciences to undertake this study. Id; see also
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 323.
37 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 323 (quoting Decennial Census Improvement
Act of 1991 § 2(a)(l)). In fact, two of the three panels established by the National Academy
of Sciences to study the undercount problem concluded that "undercount cannot be reduced to
acceptable levels at acceptable costs without the use of [a statistical sampling procedure]." Id.
It was in response to this study, as well as other research, that the Census Bureau decided to
formulate the plan to use statistical sampling for the 2000 Census. Id. at 323-24.
38 Id. at 320; see also Persily, supra note 3, at 902-16.
39 Steven A. Holmes, In a First, 2000 Census Is to Use Sampling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29,
1996, at A16. These two aims-increasing accuracy and reducing costs-were cited as the
"twin goals" of the 2000 Census by then Census Bureau Director Martha Farnsworth Rice. Id.
40 Persily, supra note 3, at 902.
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A. CONGRESS LAUNCHES AN OFFENSIVE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
V. UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Congress opposed the Census Bureau's proposal to use sampling as
a method to correct the expected census undercount and tried repeatedly
to force the Bureau to reject this measure. First, the House of Represent-
atives attached a provision designed to suspend plans for sampling to a
bill appropriating funds for the Commerce Department.4 Defying the
House's expectations, President Clinton vetoed the bill. 42 A compromise
was eventually reached, which, among other things, allowed members of
Congress and private citizens to sue the executive branch before the cen-
sus to force a decision on the legality or constitutionality of the sampling
plan.43
The two District Courts hearing these disputes both found for the
plaintiffs, permanently enjoining the Bureau's use of statistical sampling
for the purposes of determining the population for the congressional ap-
portionment on the grounds that such utilizing such methods would vio-
late the Census Act.44 The Supreme Court, consolidating the two cases
for oral argument in Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, affirmed the Glavin decision and then dismissed the ap-
peal in House of Representatives because, after Glavin, it no longer of-
fered a compelling federal question.
45
B. THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP TAKES A VICTORY MARCH
The Supreme Court narrowly upheld the District Courts' orders is-
suing permanent injunctions enjoining the Census Bureau's use of statis-
tical sampling for the congressional apportionment on statutory
grounds.46 In a "classic" Rehnquist Court five-four decision,47 the ma-
jority interpreted the text of § 195 of the Census Act 48 to expressly pro-
41 MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO CouNTs: THE POLITICS OF CEN-
sus-TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 211 (1999).
42 Id. at 207-08, 211.
43 Anderson & Feinberg, supra note 9, at 674. Although seemingly benign, this provi-
sion proved to be vitally important to the House's challenge, as it was one of the bases on
which the Supreme Court determined that the challenge was justiciable. House of Representa-




47 The determinative portion of the Court's opinion, delivered by Justice O'Connor, was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas. (Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas did decline to join in Part HI-B, which attempted to bolster the major-
ity's decision by drawing upon Congressional silence as evidence of Congressional intent. The
essential holding having already been reached, however, this fractured portion of the opinion
had no effect on the outcome.) Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all dissented.
Id. at 319.
48 13 U.S.C. § 195 (2000).
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hibit the use of sampling for the purpose of determining congressional
apportionment, even though the Census Act expressly encourages the use
of sampling in other situations.49
The Court based its interpretation of § 195 on both the legislative
history surrounding the 1976 revisions to the Census Act and the history
of the Census Act itself. It noted that the current Act contained substan-
tially the same language as its predecessors, requiring the Bureau's enu-
merators to "visit personally each dwelling" in order to gather census
information.50 In 1957, the Secretary of Commerce asked Congress to
amend the Census Act to permit the Bureau to use statistical sampling.
Congress then added § 195, which allowed the use of sampling proce-
dures only for "supplemental, nonapportionment" purposes.51 Although
Congress later repealed the provision requiring the Bureau to conduct a
personal visit, the Court found there was "no suggestion from any quarter
that this change altered the prohibition in § 195 on the use of statistical
sampling for apportionment purposes. ' 52 The Court also found that,
while the 1976 amendment to the Census Act altered the language of the
relevant provisions, this change served only to require, rather than
merely to permit, that sampling be used for purposes other than appor-
tionment. 53 Indeed, the Court found that the only "plausible reading" of
the amended § 195 was that it still "prohibits the use of sampling in
calculating the population for purposes of apportionment. '54
The Court also found that the Census Bureau itself had expressed
the same view when it determined that the Census Act "'clearly' contin-
ued the 'historical precedent of using the 'actual Enumeration' for pur-
poses of apportionment, which eschewing estimates based on sampling
or other sophisticated procedures.' 55 As such, the Court affirmed the
judgments of the two District courts.56 Because the Court decided the
49 House of Representatives, 525 U.S.-at 334. Justice O'Connor notes that § 195 quali-
fies the "broad grant of authority given in § 141(a)" of the Census Act. Id. at 338.
50 Id. at 336 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 25(c) (1954)).
51 Id. at 336-37.
52 Id. at 337.
53 Id. at 341.
54 Id. at 340. As mentioned in the text cited supra, at note 52, Justice O'Connor further
based her decision on the fact that not a single member of Congress suggested that the 1976
amendment would "so fundamentally change" the method by which the Census Bureau was
allowed to conduct the Census. This silence, she inferred, demonstrates that Congress did not
intend "to enact what would arguably be the single most significant change in the ... census
since its inception." Id. at 342-43. However, in his concurrence, Justice Scalia (joined by
Justice Thomas) "of course" took exception to this rationale based on "what was not said." Id.
at 344.
55 Id. at 340 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 69366, 69372 (1980)).
56 Id. at 344. Only a plurality of the Court supported this rationale, however. See id. at
344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (relying on the plain meaning of the statute and the doctrine
of constitutional doubt).
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question on statutory grounds, it declined to reach the constitutional
questions posed by the use of sampling or other statistical methods.
57
Although the decision to not reach the constitutional issues in House of
Representatives is perhaps sound as a matter of constitutional jurispru-
dence, 58 this decision would come back to haunt four of the five justices
in the majority three years later in Utah v. Evans.
The dissenting Justices59 argued that § 195 of the Census Act did
not limit the Bureau's authorization to use sampling in the apportionment
count, though they reached this conclusion on two different rationales.
Justice Breyer argued that § 195 banned only the use of sampling as a
substitute for traditional enumeration methods.60 Therefore, as long as
sampling is used to supplement the traditional enumeration methods, it
should be allowed. Justice Breyer further argued that the language of
§ 195 permits such a distinction. 6 1 Interestingly, he conceded this provi-
sion can be interpreted as the majority did, but he argued that § 195 also
applies to the use of sampling "in place of' traditional census methods,
because the "except" clause "does not necessarily apply to every con-
ceivable use of statistical sampling .... ,,62 Justice Breyer continued by
discussing how the "history and context" of § 195 supports his point.
Justice Stevens took a different approach. Stevens argued that
§ 195 simply informs the Bureau that it is not compelled to use sampling
in the apportionment count as would be true for other portions of the
57 Id. at 343. Justice O'Connor relied on the doctrine first promulgated in Justice Bran-
deis' famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority: "[I]f a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question
of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter." Id. (quoting
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
58 A long line of Supreme Court opinions has advocated the doctrine that the Court has a
duty to avoid Constitutional decisions when the case can be decided on statutory grounds. A
concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander is perhaps the most cited authority of
this doctrine. See supra note 57. This doctrine of self-restraint is justified because of the
conflict between the judiciary and the democratic system. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §2.12(g) (Hornbook Series 2000).
59 Two opinions dissenting on the merits were offered-one by Justice Breyer and the
other by Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. House of Repre-
sentatives, 525 U.S. at 349-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part), 357-65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 349-50.
61 Id. at 350.
62 Id. The actual text of § 195 reads: "Except for the determination of population for
purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secre-
tary shall, if he considers it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known as
"sampling" in carrying out the provisions of this title." 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994). It seems that
Justice Breyer is fight in that the first clause does not apply to every "conceivable use of
statistical sampling," but a plain reading of the statute surely demonstrates that it does prohibit
every conceivable use of sampling in the apportionment. The word "substitute" or "supple-
ment" or any term implying something similar are nowhere to be found in this provision. It is
interesting to note, however, that Justice Breyer cites a then- 17-year-old District Court opinion
to support this view. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 351.
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census. 63 He went so far as to argue that a textual comparison of the
1957 Census Act and the 1976 version demonstrates that Congress "spe-
cifically intended" to allow the use of sampling for the purposes of ap-
portionment. 64 Congress's replacement of the word "may" in the old
version with "shall" in the current version, he argued, "unambiguously
endorsed" the use of sampling.65
The dissent also reached the merits of the constitutional question,
arguing that sampling was clearly allowed under the Actual Enumeration
Clause. 66 Although the dissenting justices conceded that the apportion-
ment count was to be based on "actual population counts, rather than
mere speculation or bare estimate," they argued that this does not limit
the authority of Congress to direct the manner by which this count is
conducted. 67 The justices supported this view by citing the absence of
debate in the Constitutional Convention over the actual methods to be
used in the census. 68 The justices noted that that the "constitutional
goal" of the census, as a matter of policy, is to provide equal representa-
tion, and thus the census requires the most accurate methods possible. 69
Perhaps the most telling portion of the Court's decision, however, is
the four-justice concurrence authored by Justice Scalia.70 Though cer-
tainly not binding, Part II of this opinion offers interesting insight into
what the plurality thought of the constitutional issue-insights that
would, in at least in one instance, later prove to be inconsistent with the
decision in Utah v. Evans.
In seeking to construe the text to avoid serious constitutional doubt,
the four concurring justices argued that it is "doubtful" whether statistical
sampling is permissible under the Actual Enumeration Clause. 71 The
justices did not stop there, but rather extended their analysis to suggest
that the Actual Enumeration Clause would require an "actual count"
without any "estimation. '72 To support this view, they relied upon defi-
63 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 358 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
64 Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 362. Note that Justice Breyer did not reach this question is his dissent, but
joined Justice Stevens' opinion as to the merits of this issue.
67 Id. at 363.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 364.
70 Id. at 344-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Part II of this concurrence-the portion
at issue here-is joined Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy. Part I
is joined only by Justice Thomas. This concurrence is indeed interesting for reasons other than
the merits, as Justice Scalia actually injects the phrase "Congress swallows a camel and strains
out a gnat" into the annals of American jurisprudence. Id. at 346.
71 Id. Justice Scalia also notes that the Department of Commerce, which here argues that
sampling is consistent with the Actual Enumeration Clause, once argued the opposite. Id. at
349 (citing Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318, 1332 (E.D. Mich. 1980)).
72 Id. at 346-47.
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nitions of "enumeration" found in dictionaries that are contemporaneous
with the drafting of the Constitution-definitions that promulgate "the
notion of counting 'singly,' 'separately,' 'number by number,' [and] 'dis-
tinctly."' 73 The concurring justices argued that these definitions are in-
compatible with statistical estimates.74
The plurality also opposed allowing "estimation techniques" based
on policy grounds. 75 They feared the advent of partisan manipulation
into congressional apportionment if Congress was allowed to regulate the
entire manner in which the census was taken, unbound by any constitu-
tional constraint as to method. 76 This, they argued, would create a situa-
tion where the Court would be forced to review the estimation techniques
employed by the Bureau after each census, a prospect which these four
justices saw as "not a happy one."'77 Indeed, they even pondered whether
the Court had authority to review census results, or whether it would be
prohibited from doing so by the separation-of-powers doctrine. 78 This
portion of the concurrence proved prophetic, as the Court would be com-
pelled to face these very issues just three years later in Utah v. Evans.
III. ALL'S NOT QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT (UNTIL
UTAH RUNS TO THE COURTHOUSE TWICE):
THE IMPUTATION DISPUTE
Although the Census Bureau was bound by the decision to not use
statistical sampling for purposes of Congressional apportionment, it used
another methodology to correct the perennial undercount problem for the
2000 census. This method, called "hot-deck imputation," fills in missing
information by "imput[ing] the relevant information by inferring that the
address or unit about which it is uncertain has the same population char-
acteristics as those of a 'nearby sample or donor' address or unit."
79
The Bureau used this method of imputation during the 2000 census,
and it caused the final count for that census to be increased by a total of
1.2 million people (representing 0.4% of the total population count).80
However, problems soon developed as this relatively small percentage
was unevenly spread across the country, causing it to affect the appor-
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 348.
76 Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
77 Id. at 349.
78 Id.
79 Brief of Appellants at 7-8, 11, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 458 (2002) (No. 01-714).
The "nearby sample or 'donor"' address is defined as the "geographically closest neighbor of
the same type ... that did not return a census questionnaire." Id.
80 Id.
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tionment of the House of Representatives. 8' For example, North Caro-
lina's population increased by 0.4% while Utah's population increased
by only 0.2%.82 This meant that North Carolina gained one Representa-
tive in the House, while Utah received one fewer representative than it
otherwise would have had imputation not been used.83 In fact, Utah
missed qualifying for its fourth congressional seat by a mere 856
people. 84
A. UTAH'S FIRST KNOCK AT THE COURTHOUSE DOOR-UTAH V.
EVANS (VERSION 1)
Not surprisingly, given that it that had failed to increase its repre-
sentation in the House of Representatives by less than one-quarter of one
percent,85 Utah immediately launched a campaign to challenge the cen-
sus results.86 Utah argued against the census procedure so that it would
not, as Governor Michael Leavitt said, "lose" a seat in the House of Rep-
resentatives in what the governor deemed an unfair count.8 7
Utah first challenged a census rule that allowed the apportionment
count to include federal employees living abroad, while excluding pri-
vate employees or other Americans living outside the United States. 88
Modifying this regulation to include non-federal employees living abroad
would have created a drastic change in Utah's final count, because over
11,000 overseas missionaries 89 would have been included.90 This would
have been more than enough for Utah to close the 856 person lead held
by North Carolina, thus gaining the state an additional seat in the House




84 Janofsky, supra note 27, at A18.
85 In fact, had it been able to increase its representation in the House from three to four
seats, Utah would have increased its overall representation by roughly 0.23%.
86 Janofsky, supra note 27, at A18.
87 Id. Utah Officials and supporters often refer to the "loss" or "shift" of its fourth Con-
gressional seat to North Carolina. See id; see also Lee, supra note 13, at 4. However, the
results of the 2000 Census, both before and after Utah's challenge, left Utah with three seats in
the House of Representatives-the same number of seats it maintained for the previous decade
as a result of the 1990 Census.
88 Janofsky, supra note 27, at A18.
89 Mostly from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Id.
90 Janofsky, supra note 27, at A18. It is interesting to note that North Carolina far out-
paced Utah in the number of federal civilian and military employees abroad in 2000, with
18,360 to Utah's 3,545. Id. Had Utah succeeded in this action, North Carolina would have
benefitted from the inclusion of only 107 foreign-serving missionaries. Id.
91 Id. Had Utah's action been successful, this would not be the first time that private
American workers living abroad would be included in the census totals. Id. However, Con-
gress had elected not to include them in the last three census counts because of the difficulty of
finding Americans outside the country and thus the lack of accuracy that would result. Id.
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Upon presentation of this challenge, the House delayed final certifi-
cation of the disputed seat until a court decided the issue.92 Utah ad-
vanced three claims before the panel: first, that the regulation was
"arbitrary and capricious" and thus violated the Administrative Proce-
dure Act; second, that the Bureau's exclusion of missionaries violated
the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment; and third, that the
Apportionment Clause of the Constitution requires an "actual Enumera-
tion."'93 Utah's hopes were quickly derailed, though, when a unanimous
three-judge panel rejected all three claims and granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. 94 Utah appealed to the Supreme Court,
but the decision was affirmed without comment.95
B. ONCE, TwICE, THREE TIMES A LOSER-UTAH V. EVANS
(VERSION 2)
After its first challenge failed, Utah brought a second action chal-
lenging the census results. 96 This challenge advanced two separate
claims. First, Utah argued that the Bureau's use of "hot-deck imputa-
tion" was not allowed on statutory grounds, because it violated the Cen-
sus Act's prohibition against using "the statistical method known as
sampling."'97 Second, Utah argued that such "hot-deck imputation" is
unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the "actual Enumeration"
required by the Constitution.98 Like the plaintiffs in House of Represent-
atives, Utah sought injunctive relief.99 However, because the census had
already been conducted using this method, the Utah sought an injunction
compelling the Census Bureau to change the official census results."° °
The District Court found in favor of the Bureau, 0 1 but Utah appealed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Bu-
reau's use of "hot-deck imputation" violated either the Census Act or the
Constitution's Actual Enumeration Clause. 10 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court de-
nying Utah's claim to compel the Bureau to change the official census
results.' 0 3 Justice Breyer, writing for what even a beginning law student
92 Id.
93 Utah v. Evans, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295-98 (D. Utah 2001).
94 Id. at 1290, 1293.
95 Utah v. Evans, 534 U.S. 1038 (2001).
96 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).
97 Id. at 459 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 195).
98 Id. at 459 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Utah v. Evans, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Utah 2001).
102 Evans, 536 U.S. at 457.
103 Id. at 479.
2004]
650 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13:637
would concede is an interesting (and truly rare) majority, 10 4 found in
favor of the Census Bureau on the statutory claim by distinguishing the
methodology of "hot-deck imputation" in both "degree" and "kind" from
the sort of statistical sampling that violated the statute in House of Repre-
sentatives. 05 The purpose of sampling, the Court declared, is to extrapo-
late the features of a large population from a small sample, while
imputation only fills in missing population data.10 6
To illustrate the distinction, the majority opinion borrowed an ex-
ample from the Government's presentation of its argument before the
Court:
[Visualize] a librarian who wishes to determine the total
number of books in a library. If the librarian finds a sta-
tistically sound way to select a sample . . . and if the
librarian then uses a statistically sound method of extra-
polating from the part to the whole ... then the librarian
has determined the total number of books by using the
statistical method known as "sampling." If, however,
the librarian simply tries to count every book one by
one, the librarian has not used sampling. Nor does the
latter process suddenly become "sampling" simply be-
cause the librarian, finding empty shelf spaces, "im-
putes" to that empty shelf space the number of books...
that likely filled them.107
The majority insisted the that latter process is not sampling even if
the librarian goes about the imputation process by technical means, such
as "measuring the size of nearby books and dividing the length of each
empty shelf space by ... the average size of nearby books on the same
shelf."108
The majority also examined the phraseology of the statute and the
technical definition of sampling to support its decision. It keyed upon
the "known as" language that precedes "sampling" in § 195, finding that
this suggested that Congress thus intended sampling to be a term of art
104 Justice Breyer was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 456. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Kennedy,
concurred in the majority's treatment of the statutory issue, but dissented as to the constitu-
tional issue. Id. at 488. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion dissenting on the both the statu-
tory and constitutional merits (though concurring on the majority's treatment of jurisdiction).
Id. at 479. Justice Scalia, who had his own separation-of-powers fish to fry, dissented on
jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 510.
105 Id. at 454.
106 Id. at 465.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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"with a technical meaning."' 10 9 Based on technical literature' 1 and ex-
pert testimony"' from the District Court proceedings, the Court decided
that the term did not encompass imputation methodology." 12
In addition to ruling against Utah on its statutory claim, the Court
was not persuaded by Utah's constitutional claim. Utah argued that the
inclusion of the term "actual Enumeration" in the Constitution requires
the Census Bureau to seek out each individual in order to include him or
her in the apportionment count.113 However, the majority found that the
Constitution implies no limitation as to the methodology of the enumera-
tion. 14 Instead, the Court read the "in such Manner as the Congress
shall by Law direct" portion of the Actual Enumeration Clause to suggest
that the Constitution grants Congress broad authority in selecting the
methodology by which the census is to be conducted. 115
IV. GIVE PEACE A CHANCE: RECONCILING THE TWO
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
An attempt to reconcile the decisions in House of Representatives
and Evans reveals that the Supreme Court has utterly failed to provide
any guidance on the issue of what types of potential estimation methods
will pass constitutional muster. On their faces, these two opinions do not
seem to conflict with each other, since the constitutional issue was never
reached in House of Representatives." 16 Nonetheless, an analysis of the
different opinions reveals that Chief Justice Rehnquist was wholly incon-
sistent in his rationale. This fact is of vital importance to lawmakers,
practitioners, and constitutional scholars today because it limits their
ability to predict what the Constitution will tolerate as to census method-
ology. The inconsistencies between these opinions mean that these
groups are no more informed now than before these cases reached the
high court. The results of future census litigation are thus seemingly
unpredictable.
House of Representatives and Evans, however, present a rare oppor-
tunity to compare two opinions that were issued by the same court on the
same issue only three years apart. (As such, the number of variables that
109 Id. at 467.
1 10 The Court cited several technical treatises to support its view that sampling includes
only those methodologies where a part of a population is used to make inferences about the
whole population. Id. at 467-68.
111 It is interesting to note that the expert testimony on which the Court relied came from
the Census Bureau's own statisticians. Id. at 468.
1 12 Id. at 467-70.
113 Id. at 473. See also Brief of Appellant at 35, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No.
01-714).
114 Evans, 536 U.S. at 474.
115 Id.
116 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 343.
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might explain the apparent divergence of these two opinions is greatly
reduced.) Easily the most curious thing that is revealed by these two
decisions is the complete about-face that Chief Justice Rehnquist made
from his decision in House of Representatives to his decision in-
Evans. 117
It is not difficult to understand the Chief Justice's agreement with
the majority's treatment of the statutory question in Evans, as Justice
Breyer convincingly distinguished imputation from the sampling that
was banned by § 195.118 Even the most ardent critic of the Court's deci-
sion in that case can recognize that the inclusion of the "known as" lan-
guage in § 195 can be fairly read to inform the courts that the word
"sampling" was to be interpreted according to its technical definition. 19
Had this not been the case, it seems plausible Congress would simply
have not included the words "known as" and would have instead used
such language as "shall authorize the use of sampling."' 20
Unfortunately, one cannot feasibly reconcile Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's determination of the constitutional issue in these two cases. Ad-
mittedly, the House of Representatives Court did not reach the
constitutional issue in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion. 21 Nonethe-
less, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the portion of Justice Scalia's con-
currence that clearly suggested that the Actual Enumeration Clause
requires the Census Bureau to undertake an "actual counting" without
allowing any sort of estimation.' 22 This opinion sought to divine the
meaning the Framers intended to import into the word "enumeration" by
referring to several dictionaries that were published or in use at the time
of the writing of the Constitution's text.' 23 These concurring Justices,
including the Chief Justice, did not attempt to limit their argument to
"statistical sampling"; rather, they specifically argued against the consti-
117 In Evans, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the four "liberal" justices, giving them the
majority needed to decide the case. The other four justices (Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and
Thomas), with whom the Chief Justice most often aligns, each dissented on one ground or
another.
1 18 See Evans, 536 U.S. at 465-73.
119 Id. at 467.
120 Principles of constitutional interpretation justify the Court's argument that the "known
as" language limits the definition of the word "sampling." In interpreting a statute, the Court
will "consider not only the bare meaning" of the critical word or phrase "but also its placement
and purpose in the statutory scheme." Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995).
Furthermore, because Congress included these words in the statute, it is well-settled that they
should be given meaning. Cf. Pa. Dep't. Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990)
(citing the proposition that all statutory interpretation must begin with the language of the
statute itself). See also E.A. DRIEDGER, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 92 (2d ed. 1983) (citing
the proposition that a "reader of statutes ... has the right to assume ... that every word has
meaning and function").
121 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 343.
122 Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id.
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tutionality of any "estimation of number."'' 24 Had the Justices intended
to limit the scope of their argument to the constitutionality of statistical
sampling, it seems they would have articulated that intent.1 25 However,
the opinion employed other non-limiting terms, which suggests that con-
curring justices meant to broaden the scope of the argument. 126
However, only three years later, the Chief Justice reversed course
from the concurring opinion in House of Representatives and joined a
rare majority 127 in Evans that specifically allowed imputation as consis-
tent with the Actual Enumeration Clause within the constitutional text. 128
The Evans majority (of which the Chief Justice was a part) took a posi-
tion diametrically opposed to Justice Scalia's in House of Representa-
tives (which the Chief Justice also joined). The Evans majority
specifically found that the Actual Enumeration Clause does not specify
"any ...limitation" to the method by which the Census Bureau may
conduct its work.1 29 Instead, it asserted that the "in such Manner as Con-
gress shall by Law direct" language at the end of the Actual Enumeration
Clause suggests a broad methodological allowance to Congress (and
therefore to the Census Bureau, to whom Congress delegates the power
to conduct the census), rather than a limited one. 130 The majority even
sought to use the same semantic evidence that the majority employed in
House of Representatives, finding that a study of "[c]ontemporaneous
general usage" of the term "Enumeration" reveals no particular reference
to methodology. 131 Furthermore, it argued that "actual Enumeration," as
it was used in the constitutional text, could not have been a term of art, as
the Constitution later refers to a "Census of Enumeration."' 32
In sum, we are left with two contradictory opinions, both of which
were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, regarding whether methods other
than an actual count will pass constitutional muster. Owing to the pur-
124 Id. at 346-47. One will notice later that the concurrence refined its analysis to disal-
low "gross statistical estimates." Id. at 347. However, this seemingly still is a broad defini-
tion, reaching far beyond the limits of sampling.
125 See id. at 346. See also supra note 102.
126 See DRIEDGER, supra note 120, at 92. Although Professor Driedger refers to the inter-
pretation of statutes, it seems plausible that the same principles may be applied to the interpre-
tation of judicial opinions. It strikes one as particularly unlikely that a writing technician such
as Justice Scalia would interchange these terms so loosely.
127 A search of the Supreme Court databases on both Westlaw® and Lexis® reveals, at
the time of this writing, only one other case where the majority was comprised solely of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, with no other justice
concurring in the judgment. Interestingly enough, that case concerned the constitutionality of
a state redistricting plan-an issue not totally unrelated to apportionment at issue here. See
Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 512 U.S. 567-68 (1997).
128 Evans, 536 U.S. at 473-79.
129 Id. at 474.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 475.
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
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posefully broad arguments presented in' each opinion, we cannot recon-
cile the two. Therefore, after two decisions on the merits, we still do not
know whether the Chief Justice thinks the Actual Enumeration Clause
permits the Census Bureau to employ any methodology other than an
actual count. As both cases were decided by a slim five-four majority,
the Chief Justice's opinion will most likely prove vital in predicting the
results of future litigation over census methodology. 33 It remains un-
clear, however, why Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed courses in Evans
and decided in favor of granting the Census Bureau wide constitutional
latitude in conducting the decennial enumeration. 134 But perhaps even
more important and difficult, it must be decided whether the Supreme
Court will adopt the Evans majority's broad permissive view of the Ac-
tual Enumeration Clause or whether it will seek to give it some formal
meaning in future census litigation.
V. WHO WON THE BATTLE?: A CRITIQUE OF EACH
OPINION'S APPROACH
Based on the long history of litigation over the constitutionality of
the method by which the Census is conducted 135 and the seemingly con-
voluted opinions offered by the Supreme Court on the matter, it seems
safe to assume that such litigation will continue to increase. Nonethe-
less, the resolution of this debate involves far more than a mere theoreti-
cal exercise. The figures and statistics arrived at by the census have a
variety of applications with far-reaching practical and constitutional
implications.
Census figures, besides determining the strength of a state's delega-
tion to the House of Representatives, are also used to allocate Electoral
College votes and to distribute funds to state and local governments for
programs such as education, public health, and highway construction. 136
As such, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection is naturally im-
133 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have become the Court's swing vote on this
particular issue.
134 One possible explanation for the Chief Justice's switch is fear of the looming separa-
tion-of-powers problem that might well have resulted had Utah been successful before the
Court. This fear, first predicted in the now infamous concurrence in House of Representatives
was the subject of some debate during oral arguments. See 525 U.S., at 349. In fact, Justice
Scalia openly doubted whether the Court had the power to compel the executive to redress
Utah's supposed injury at all. Supreme Court Official Transcript at 5-13, Utah v. Evans, 536
U.S. 452 (March 27, 2002) (No. 01-714). Justice Scalia's dissent on jurisdictional grounds
was based on this issue. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2223-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, this
cannot be justified as the Chief Justice's rationale, for even had he sided with his usual con-
servative bedfellows, Justice Scalia's dissent on jurisdictional grounds would have created a
fractured opinion, which would have resulted in an affirmation of the decision below (which
was also against Utah). Thus, the final result of the case would not have changed.
135 See generally Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 9, at 673.
136 Id. at 667, 670.
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plicated in the census results. The constitutional determination of the
question of the meaning of the Actual Enumeration Clause will dictate
how the Census Bureau ensures that it does not violate citizens' rights to
equal protection by undercounting them. We must determine whether
the majority's broad view of this census clause in Evans will withstand
future court scrutiny.
At this time, it seems unclear whether this clause should retain this
broad meaning, or whether the Court should follow the formal analysis
that Justice Scalia promulgated in his concurrence in House of Repre-
sentatives. Of course, it is far outside the ability of this author's legal
mind to provide a solution that has befuddled our country's highest court.
But several points should perhaps be considered before one attempts to
answer this question in the future.
First, an analysis of the history of the Actual Enumeration Clause
and the Constitutional Convention will attempt to shed light on the think-
ing and intent of the Framers.1 37 Second, a brief analysis of the solution
proposed by the State of Utah in its case before the Supreme Court will
reveal several fundamental problems that render it undesirable. Finally,
an argument will be offered that the Court should have exercised self-
restraint and declined to touch these cases because they present a politi-
cal question outside the authority of the judiciary.
A. DRUMBEATS OF WAR: THE HISTORY OF THE ACTUAL
ENUMERATION CLAUSE
The Framers mandated the decennial census in order to determine
how political power would be apportioned among the "disparate" popu-
lation of the New Republic.' 38 This was fundamental because the Fram-
ers, having deemed the people of the United States responsible for
running the national government, believed the correct apportionment of
political power would be the "fundamental ... instrument" of this repub-
lican government.' 39 Those areas of where population was declining or
growing more slowly would have to cede political power to areas of high
population growth.' 40 In selecting this method, the Framers rejected
other available methods of apportioning representatives, such as accord-
ing to wealth.14 '
137 The reader will surely note that several of the sources relied on by this author here
were also cited by both Justice Scalia in his concurrence in House of Representatives, Justice
Stevens in his treatment of the constitutional questions in Evans, and Justice Thomas in his
opposite treatment in the same case.
138 Anderson & Fienberg, supra note 9, at 666.
139 Id. at 666-67.
140 Id. at 667.
141 See Hazard, supra note 4, at 91.
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The Framers sought to make the apportionment count as objective
as possible, and so they gave responsibility for this count to the federal
government in order to avoid the possibility of corruption by state polit-
ics.' 4 2 To do so, they included a clause in the Constitution that would
require a recount of the population every ten years. 143 The early drafts of
this clause referred specifically to a "census" that would be taken every
ten years.' 44 However, the final version of the Constitution, as ratified,
replaced this term with "actual Enumeration." 145 Some argue that this
language choice was not "out of naivet6 or unfamiliarity with methods of
estimation," but rather was a deliberate choice in order to minimize the
risk of political manipulation of congressional apportionment. 46
Of course, the Constitution's text does not specify what is meant by
"actual Enumeration."'' 47 The clause reads only:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States ... according to their respec-
tive Numbers . . . counting the whole number of free
Persons in each state .... The actual Enumeration shall
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States in such Manner as they
shall by Law direct .... 148
However, the history of the writing of this phrase does provide
some insight into its meaning. The Constitutional Convention sent its
Committee of Detail a draft which stated that the Congress was to "regu-
late the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, ...
which number shall ... be taken in such manner as ... [Congress] shall
direct."' 149 The Committee of Detail sent this draft to the Committee of
Style, which revised the language to include the phrase "actual Enumera-
tion."'150 Since the Convention granted the Committee of Style abso-
lutely no authority to alter the meaning of its drafts, 15' the majority in
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 92.
145 Id.
146 Lee, supra note 13, at 1. Professor Lee, one of those who espouse this view, repre-
sented the State of Utah before the Supreme Court in Utah v. Evans.
147 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474 (2002).
148 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
149 2 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 178, 182-83 (rev.
ed. 1966).
15o Id. at 590-91. Before submitting its draft to the Committee of Style, the Committee of
Detail made some minor changes to the draft submitted to it by the Convention. These
changes, however, are irrelevant to the present discussion.
151 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474-75 (2002) (citing Powell v. McCornack, 395 U.S.
486, 538-39 (1969) and Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231 (1993)). In fact, after the
Committee on Style had prepared its revised draft of the Constitution, it spent three full days in
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Evans took this, to I'strongly suggest" that the terms "actual Enumera-
tion" have a similar meaning to the words in the original draft.' 52 As
such, the Justices argued, "actual Enumeration" became the substantial
equivalent of the draft phrase "which number [of inhabitants] shall. . be
taken in such manner as [Congress] shall direct."'15
3
However, both the Framers' writings and the transcripts of the their
debates perhaps justify a different conclusion as to the meaning of "ac-
tual Enumeration." George Washington wrote a letter contrasting a pop-
ulation "estimate" with a "census" or "enumeration."' 154  Similarly,
Thomas Jefferson compared the "actual returns" with "conjectures."', 55
George Mason argued for "some permanent & precise standard as essen-
tial" while debating the proposal to compel a decennial census. 156 James
Madison made a similar distinction during a debate over the first Census
Act when he noted that the census would provide an "exact number of
every division" as opposed to "assertions and conjectures."' 157 Madison
also provided some of the stronger evidence regarding the meaning the
founders ascribed to the term "actual Enumeration" when he pointed out
during this same debate that there would be substantial difficulties in
taking the Census "in the way required by the Constitution," but noting
that Congress was nevertheless "obliged to perform." 158 Madison further
discussed the importance of ensuring an accurate count when he wrote
that the Constitution extended the apportionment to control direct taxa-
tion in order to directly counter the states' temptation to inflate their pop-
ulation counts to secure greater representation. 159 This evidence
suggests the Framers intended for the Actual Enumeration Clause to im-
plicate some formal requirements and not simply to be a broad grant of
power to Congress to manipulate methodology without limit.
As mentioned above, both opinions referred to the general usage of
the word "enumeration" during the 18th century to provide support for
their view of the meaning the Framers intended to subscribe to "actual
the Convention comparing each article of the revised draft delivered by the Committee with
the record that was provided to that committee to ensure that no substantive changes were
made. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 187 (1913).
152 Evans, 536 U.S. at 474-75. Although the Supreme Court characterizes this lack of
authority as a strong suggestion, it also notes that it can provide no dispositive definition to the
term. Id.
153 Id. at 475.
154 31 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 329 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). Utah relied
upon this letter in its appeal in Evans, but the majority quickly dismissed it. Evans, 536 U.S.
at 475.
155 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 236 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
156 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrITION 102-03 (Philip B. Kurland. & Ralph Lerner, eds.,
1987).
157 Id. at 139.
158 Id.
159 THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison).
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Enumeration." Dictionaries extant at the time of the:Constitutional Con-
vention defined the word "enumeration" as an "act of numbering or
counting over"160 or a "numbering or summing up."' 16 1 Legal documents
at the time did not give the term a specialized meaning. 162 The term
"actual" was defined in dictionaries contemporaneous with the writing of
the Constitution as "really done . . . which has real being or existence,
and is opposite to potential"' 16 3 or "not merely potential ... not purely in
speculation."' 164 However, the Constitution does later refer to the "actual
Enumeration" as a "Census or Enumeration" in a different clause of Arti-
cle IX.165 Of course, the Evans majority rejects these definitions as pro-
viding no evidence of the Framers' intent to place limits on the conduct
of the Census because they make no reference to methodology. 166 How-
ever, based on plain language, "counting" or "numbering" seems to be
methodologically separate and distinct from "sampling" or "estimation."
B. WRONG Is NOT BETTER THAN RIGHT: THE UNREASONABLENESS
OF UTAH'S CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
In Evans, Utah argued before the Court that the Actual Enumeration
Clause requires an actual count, without any sort of adjustment. 67 Of
course, it supported this argument with a myriad of historical and seman-
tic evidence, much of which is discussed above, and much of which
seems quite convincing.
Unfortunately, this solution gives rise to another ugly issue that can-
not easily be dismissed. Based on the fact that the census perpetually
undercounts the population, 168 especially before the Bureau tried to sup-
plement traditional methods, Utah appeared to believe that the Constitu-
tion prefers incorrect and undercounted census returns over accurate
ones. This would result in the undesirable situation where the Constitu-
tion would require a potentially malapportioned Congress and Electoral
160 Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 347
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
658 (4th rev. ed. 1773)).
161 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 475 (2002) (citing N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMO-
LOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789)).
162 Id. at 475-76.
163 Id. at 475 (citing N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(26th ed, 1789)).
164 House of Representatives, 525 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing T. SHERIDAN,
A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed., 1796)).165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. This provision prohibits the Congress from levying a
"Capitation" or other direct tax unless in proportion to the Census.
166 Evans, 536 U.S. at 475.
167 Brief of Appellant at 35, Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002) (No. 01-714). See also
Lee, supra note 13.
168 There is also evidence that even the first censuses resulted in inaccurate counts. Ev-
ans, 536 U.S. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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College and the, inequitable allocation of funds and services to state and
local government.
This result is not only absurd, but also surely unconstitutional. For
one, it would certainly violate the Equal Protection Clause in that it
would result in congressional districts that were not apportioned accord-
ing to population. 169 As such, it would undo four decades of Supreme
Court civil rights jurisprudence. 170 Furthermore, it would violate the
fundamental principle of statutory and constitutional interpretation that
all laws be given a sensible construction so as to avoid "injustice, oppres-
sion, or an absurd consequence."' 71 Finally, favoring census un-
dercounts would lead to a paradoxical situation in which a provision of
the Constitution compels an unconstitutional result. 172 That is simply
unacceptable, and so this solution must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Thanks in part to potentially unworkable solutions and an inconsis-
tent Chief Justice, predicting the constitutionality of methodologies to
enhance the census remains beyond the ken of mortal lawyers. The issue
is a complicated and politically charged one, and the Supreme Court,
despite two attempts, has been unable to arrive at an appropriate solution
that provides guidance for future census disputes. In an era of ever-
shrinking budgets and increased costs, the Census Bureau will likely
continue to rely on methods other than actual counting to increase the
accuracy of the decennial count. However, the subjectivity inherent in
those results will surely provoke future litigation. Instead of providing
the Census Bureau with guidance for how the future counts can be val-
idly conducted, recent opinions from the Supreme Court have only ren-
dered the issue more muddled and confusing.
169 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
170 See Anderson & Feinberg, supra note 9, at 670-7 1.
171 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868).
172 One can only imagine, after reading his camel/gnat reference in House of Representa-
tives, how Justice Scalia would characterize this unique situation. See Dep't of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 346 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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